World Population Prospects 2024
World Population Prospects 2024: Ten Key Messages
1. The world’s population is likely to peak within the current century.
• The world’s population is expected to continue growing over the coming 50 or 60 years, reaching a peak of around 10.3 billion people in the mid-2080s, up from 8.2 billion in 2024.
• After peaking, the global population is projected to start declining gradually, falling to 10.2 billion people by the end of the century.
• The estimated likelihood that the world’s population will peak within the current century is very high (with a probability of 80 per cent).
• This represents a major change compared to projections published by the United Nations in 2013, when the estimated probability that global population growth would end during the twenty-first century was around 30 per cent.
• The size of the world’s population in 2100 is now expected to be 6 per cent smaller – or about 700 million people fewer – than anticipated a decade ago.
• The earlier occurrence of a peak in the projected size of the global population is due to several factors including lower-than-expected levels of fertility in recent years in some of the world’s largest countries, particularly
China.
2. One in four people globally lives in a country whose population has already peaked in size.
• In 63 countries and areas – containing 28 per cent of the world’s population in 2024 – the size of the
population peaked before 2024. This group includes China, Germany, Japan and the Russian Federation.
he number of people living in these locations is projected to decline by 14 per cent over the next thirty years,
• In 48 countries and areas, representing 10 per cent of the world’s population in 2024, the population size is projected to peak between 2025 and 2054. This group includes Brazil, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Türkiye and Viet Nam. The size of the population in these locations is projected to increase by 5.3 per cent over the next thirty years,
• In the remaining 126 countries and areas, the population is likely to continue growing through 2054, potentially reaching a peak later in the century or beyond 2100. This group includes several of the world’s most populous countries, such as India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan and the United States of America.
• The number of people living in these locations is projected to increase by 38 per cent through 2054. In nine of these countries and areas, including Angola, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Niger and Somalia, population growth is likely to be very rapid, with populations doubling between 2024 and 2054.
• The trajectory of population change for this last group will have a major influence on the size and timing of the population peak at the global level
3. Women today bear, one child fewer, on average, than they did around 1990.
• Currently, the global fertility rate stands at 2.25 live births per woman,1 down from 3.31 births in 1990.
• More than half of all countries and areas globally have fertility below the replacement level of 2.1 live births per woman. This is the level required for a population to maintain a constant size in the long run without migration, with each generation followed by another of roughly equal size.
• Currently, nearly one fifth of all countries and areas, including China, Italy, the Republic of Korea and Spain, are experiencing what is sometimes referred to as “ultra-low” fertility, with fewer than 1.4 live births per woman over a lifetime.
• For 24 countries with ultra-low fertility in 2024 and where the population has already peaked, a return to 2.1 births per woman or higher within the next 30 years is highly unlikely (probability of 0.1 per cent).
• By the late 2030s, half of the women in countries with populations that have already peaked will be too old to have children by natural means.
4. Early childbearing has harmful effects on young mothers and their children.
In 2024, 4.7 million babies, or about 3.5 per cent of the total worldwide, were born to mothers under age 18 –
and some 340,000, to girls under age 15 – with serious consequences for the health and well-being of both the
young mothers and their children. Investing in the education of youth, especially girls, and increasing the ages at marriage and first childbearing in countries where these milestone events tend to occur early will have positive
effects on women’s health, educational attainment and labour force participation.
5. Following the COVID-19 pandemic, global life expectancy is rising once again.
Globally, life expectancy at birth reached 73.3 years in 2024, an increase of 8.4 years since 1995. Further reductions
in mortality are projected to result in an average longevity of around 77.4 years globally in 2054. Since 2022, life
expectancy has returned to pre-COVID-19 levels in nearly all countries and areas. My Comment: Covid killed mainly elderly; its effects upon population projection might have been very different if it had killed many women of child-bearing age and/or their children.
6. The main driver of global population increase through mid-century will be the momentum
created by growth in the past.
• Globally, the number of women in the reproductive age range (roughly, between 15 and 49 years) is projected to grow through the late 2050s, when it will likely peak at around 2.2 billion, up from nearly 2.0 billion in 2024. Growth in the number of women of reproductive age is conducive to continuing population increase even when the number of births per woman falls to the replacement level or lower.
• The momentum of past growth that is embedded in the youthful age structure of today’s global population is projected to contribute 79 per cent of the total increase through 2054, or around 1.4 billion people.
• In a population that is closed to migration, when fertility remains below the replacement level for an extended period, the number of women of reproductive age starts to decline as successive cohorts become smaller and smaller. (This will be the fate of the US if we close our borders to immigrants)In countries with populations that have already peaked, the number of women in the reproductive age range is projected to shrink by 33 per cent between 2024 and 2054.
• For some populations, a prolonged history of fertility below the replacement level has resulted in a declining population and an age distribution that is significantly older than in the past. For 18 countries and areas, today’s older age distribution is likely to be the main driver of population decline between now and 2054. Even assuming a substantial rebound in the fertility level, these populations are likely to continue declining in size because of the momentum of past decline.
7. Countries with youthful populations and declining fertility have a limited time to benefit
economically from an increasing concentration of population in the working ages.
• For nearly all countries and areas with populations that have peaked in size by 2024, and for three quarters of those with populations projected to peak between 2025 and 2054, the time-bound window of opportunity for accelerated economic growth associated with a youthful population and declining fertility has already closed.
• In around 100 countries and areas, however, the share of population in the working ages (between 20 and 64 years) will continue to increase more rapidly than the total population between now and 2054, providing a window of opportunity known as the “demographic dividend”. The US is prosperous in large part because of our demographic dividend, e.g. the baby boom.
8. By 2080, persons aged 65 or older will outnumber children under 18.
• By the late 2070s, the number of persons at ages 65 years and higher globally is projected to reach 2.2
billion, surpassing the number of children (under age 18). By the mid-2030s, it is projected that there will be 265 million persons aged 80 years or older, more than the number of infants (1 year of age or less).
• In countries where the size of the population has already peaked or is projected to peak in the coming
decades, the crossover between the number of children and persons aged 65 or older will occur sooner.
• Even in countries with populations that are still growing rapidly and have relatively youthful populations, the number of persons aged 65 or older is expected to rise over the next 30 years.
9. For some populations, immigration will be the main driver of future growth.
• In 50 countries and areas, immigration is projected to attenuate the decline in population size caused by sustained low levels of fertility and an older age structure.
• For countries such as Italy, Germany and the Russian Federation, where population size has already peaked, the peak would have occurred sooner in the absence of immigration.
• Immigration is projected to be the main driver of population growth in 52 countries and areas through 2054 and in 62 through 2100, including Australia, Canada and the United States of America.
10. Gender equality and women’s empowerment help to counter rapid population growth or decline.
World Population Prospects 2024 Summary of the Results
Key messages .......................................................................................................................................VII
Introduction .............................................................................................................................................1
Chapter I. Awareness of population trends is critical for achieving a sustainable future ........................3
Chapter II. Countries and areas with populations that have already peaked .........................................15
Chapter III. Countries and areas with populations likely to peak within 30 years ................................25
Chapter IV. Countries and areas with populations likely to grow through 2054...................................33
References .............................................................................................................................................47
Annex 1: What’s new in WPP 2024? .....................................................................................................51
Annex 2: Selected indicators ..................................................................................................................53